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DEFINING CONTROL: A STUDY
OF THE JET-ETIHAD CASE
-Rajat

Sethi, Simran Dhir and Dhruv Agarwal

S&R Associates

I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of control is key to several significant Indian legislations.
"Control" over corporate bodies appears in various forms: single control, joint
control, control by virtue of shareholding, rights or custom. Further, control may
have different meanings in the context of different legislations, depending upon
the objective of the legislation in question. The consequences of a finding of control also vary under different legislations.
In this article, we explore the concept of "control" under certain Indian
laws, focusing on the Jet-Etihad case as dealt with by the Foreign Investment
Promotion Board ("FIPB"), the Securities and Exchange Board of India ("SEBr")
and the Competition Commission of India ("CCI") to illustrate the key issues in
this regard.
II. THE CONCEPT OF "CONTROL"
Control is defined differently in different legislations, depending upon the particular understanding of control relevant for the legislation, and the level of control appropriate to such understanding.
The definitions of control in four key corporate legislations are set out below:
Legislation

Definition

Securities and Exchange
Board of India (Substantial
Acquisition of Shares and
Takeovers) Regulations,
2011 ("Takeover Code")

"control" includes the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the
management or policy decisions exercisable by aperson or persons acting individually
or inconcert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or
management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or inany other
manner [Regulation 2(1)(e)]

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

27 NLSI REV. (2015)

Legislation

Definition

Competition Act, 2012
("Competition Act")

"control" includes controlling the affairs or management by(i)one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another enterprise or group;
(ii)one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or enterprise
[Explanation (a)to Section 5(c)]

Companies Act, 2013
("Companies Act")

"control" shall include the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the
management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually
or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or
management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other
manner [Section 2(27)]

Consolidated FDIPolicy
of 2015

'Control' shall include the right to appoint a majority of the directors or to control
the management or policy decisions including by virtue of their shareholding
or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements
[Paragraph 2.1.6]

A. Definition of Control under the Takeover Code
The definition of control under the Takeover Code is identical to the definition of "control" under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997, which it replaced. The
primary context in which "control" is used in the Takeover Code is to determine
whether an acquirer has acquired "control" over a target company, so that the
other investors in the company should be provided an option to exit their investment in the company given such change in control. The consequence of a finding of control in this context would ordinarily be that the relevant acquirer would
have to make an offer to purchase the shares of the target company from the
shareholders that choose to exit the company upon such change in control.
The definition of control under the Takeover Code has been litigated upon
before various authorities and courts, including the Supreme Court of India, without achieving significant clarity on its interpretation. A crucial ruling in this matter was expected in the appeal filed by SEBI before the Supreme Court against
the ruling of Securities Appellate Tribunal ("SAT") in Subhkam Ventures (I)
(P)Ltd. v. SEB. The SAT, in its ruling', had disagreed with SEBI's finding that
Subhkam Ventures (I) Private Limited ("Subhkam") had acquired "control" over
a target company pursuant to acquisition of certain rights in the target company.
The rights acquired by Subhkam included the right to appoint a nominee director of the target company who would be required to constitute quorum for board
meetings. Further, Subhkam had acquired affirmative rights in respect of certain
actions of the target company including the right to approve the annual business
plan of the target company, the appointment of key officers of the target company
Subhkam Ventures (I) (P)Ltd. v. SEBI, 2010 SCC OnLine SAT 35, available at http://www.sebi.
gov.inlsatorders/subhkamventures.pdf
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(including the CEO and CFO), and the entry into strategic investments and joint
ventures by the target company.
The SAT opined that the rights acquired by Subhkam were 'protective' in
nature, and did not extend to the day-to-day control over the target company.
Further, the SAT held that negative rights do not amount to "effective control"
over a company. The Supreme Court did not rule on this matter since it accepted
an out of court settlement between the parties in this matter. Further, in its order
disposing of the matter, the Supreme Court clarified that the ruling of the SAT in
this matter would not constitute a precedent 2.
Accordingly, the scope of the definition of "control" under the Takeover Code
particularly where it concerns negative or veto rights over actions of companies,
is not entirely clear.
B. Definition of Control under the Companies Act
The definition of control under the Companies Act is identical to the definition of control under the Takeover Code. The concept of "control" under the
Companies Act is used in several contexts, such as determination of relationships of "promoter" of companies, and "subsidiaries" of companies. Since the
Companies Act is a relatively new legislation, there has not been much development of the concept of control in this context.
C. Definition of Control under the Foreign Direct Investment Policy
The Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") Policy is an executive policy of the
Government of India which determines the level of foreign investment permitted
in Indian companies in certain sectors. The definition of control in the FDI Policy
is used to determine whether a company is controlled by Indian nationals or foreign entities in accordance with the relevant sectoral policy set out in the FDI
Policy. The consequence of a finding of foreign control over a company that is
required to be controlled by Indians under the FDI Policy would be that the relevant investment proposal would not be in compliance with the FDI Policy, and if
it requires the prior approval of the FIPB, would be rejected by the FIPB.
Press Note 4 of 2013, published on August 22, 20133, changed the definition of "control" under the FDI Policy to a definition substantially similar to the
definitions of control under the Takeover Code and the Companies Act. News
reports suggested that the rationale for including a definition of "control" in the
2

SEBI v. Subhkam Ventures (I) (P) Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 3371 of 2010, decided on 16-11-2011

3

Department

(SC).
of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
Government of India, Press Note No. 4, 2013 Series (22 August, 2013), available at: http://dipp.
nic.inlEnglishacts rules/Press Notes/pn4 2013.pdf.
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FDI Policy similar to that under the Takeover Code and Companies Bill was
to "align" the definition of "control" across legislations, and provide clarity to
4
investors.
There are certain differences between the definition of "control" under the
FDI Policy and that under the Takeover Code: first, while the definition of control
under the FDI Policy is limited to rights acquired "by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements", the
definition of control under the Takeover Code also includes rights acquired "by
any other manner". Second, the definition of control under the Takeover Code
explicitly includes "indirect" control, which is not included in the definition of
control under the FDI Policy.
The definition of control under the Competition Act is analysed in detail in the
next section.
III. DEFINITION OF CONTROL UNDER
THE COMPETITION ACT
Under the Competition Act, all "combinations" require the approval of the
CCI. A combination is a merger or acquisition (including an acquisition of control) where the parties to the transaction satisfy certain asset and turnover
thresholds.
Further, Schedule I of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in
regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011
("Combination Regulations") sets out certain categories of combinations which
do not "ordinarily" require the approval of the CCI, except where such transactions result in a change of control (either an acquisition of control, or a change
from "joint control" to "sole control") 5. In addition, the term control is used in
the context of determining "group" companies of a company to be taken into
Cabinet eases foreign investment norms LIVE MINT (August 1, 2013, available at http://www.live-

mint.com/Politics/hy7qJnJkTDxreleDjIdkNK/Govt-eases-investment-rules-for-foreign-retailers.
html).
Paragraph 1 to this Schedule reads: "An acquisition of shares or voting rights... solely as an
investment or in the ordinary course of business in so far as the total shares or voting rights
held by the acquirer directly or indirectly, does not entitle the acquirer to hold twenty five per
cent (2500) or more of the total shares or voting rights of the company... not leading to acquisition of control of the enterprise whose shares or voting rights are being acquired."
Paragraph IA to this Schedule reads: 'An acquisition of additional shares or voting rights
of an enterprise by the acquirer or its group, not resulting in gross acquisition of more than
five per cent (500) of the shares or voting rights of such enterprise in a financial year, where
the acquirer or its group, prior to acquisition, already holds twenty five per cent (25%) or more
shares or voting rights of the enterprise, but does not hold fifty per cent (50%) or more of the
shares or voting rights of the enterprise, either prior to or after such acquisition. Provided that
such acquisition does not result in acquisition of sole or joint control of such enterprise by the
acquirer or its group."
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account when assessing the asset and turnover thresholds applicable to "groups"
which qualify as combinations 6.
The object of the Competition Act is to protect competition in Indian markets
for goods and services. Accordingly, the CCI would be concerned with transactions which involve an acquisition of control that could determine the strategic
commercial behaviour of an enterprise, including changes in the quality of control (i.e., joint control to sole control or vice versa). Therefore, the consequence of
a finding of "control" under the Competition Act is that such a transaction (which
also satisfies the relevant asset and turnover thresholds) will require the prior
approval of the CCI.
The Competition Act does not contain a qualitative definition of control (see
Table above). The concept of "control" under the Competition Act has developed
through certain orders of the CCI where it has expounded its understanding of
control in the context of the Competition Act. Three key rulings of the CCI in
this regard are analysed below.
A. Century Tokyo Leasing Corporation/Tata Capital Financial
Services Limited
In this case7, the parties had entered into a Business Partnership Agreement,
which conferred certain rights relating to the 'leasing division' of Tata Capital
Financial Services Limited ("Tata Capital") upon Century Tokyo Leasing
Corporation ("Century Tokyo"). These included the right for Century Tokyo to
nominate a person to the supervisory committee governing the leasing division,
and that decisions on certain matters in relation to the leasing division required
the consent of the Century Tokyo's nominee. The CCI, in its order, stated that
such matters related to the strategic affairs of the leasing division, including (i)
approval of business plans, (ii) approval of annual operating plans and budget,
(iii) commencing a new line of activity or discontinuing an existing line of business, (iv) appointment of key managerial personnel of the leasing division and
their compensation. In addition, Century Tokyo also acquired an option to transfer the leasing division to a joint venture company owned jointly by Century
Tokyo and Tata Capital.

Paragraph 2 to this Schedule reads: 'An acquisition of shares or voting rights... where the
acquirer,prior to acquisition, has fifty percent (5000) or more shares or voting rights in the
enterprise whose shares or voting rights are being acquired, except in the cases where the transaction results in transferfrom joint control to sole control."
6

Explanation (b) to Section 5(c), Competition Act, 2002.
CCI's order dated October 4, 2012, available
OrderOfCommissionlCombinationOrders/C-2012-09-78.pdf.

at

http://www.cci.gov.in!May20ll/

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

27 NLSI REv. (2015)

Based on the rights referred to above, the CCI held that the Business
Partnership Agreement conferred joint control over the assets and operations of
the leasing division to Century Tokyo.
B. Multi Screen Media Private Limited/SPE Mauritius Holdings
Limited and SPE Mauritius Investments Limited
In this case8 , SPE Mauritius Holdings Limited and SPE Mauritius Investments
Limited (together, "SPE") were acquiring 32.39% of the shares of Multi Screen
Media Private Limited ("MSM") from Grandway Global Holdings Limited and
Atlas Equifin Private Limited. SPE already held 62% of the equity shares of
MSM.
Schedule I of the Combinations Regulations provides that acquisitions of
equity shares of a company where the acquirer already holds 50% or more of the
equity shares of the company would be exempt from the notification and approval
requirements applicable to combinations, except where the transaction results in
acquisition of "sole control" from "joint control".
In this case, while SPE (the acquirer) held more than 50% of the equity shares
of MSM (the target), the CCI found that the combination resulted in a transition from joint control to sole control, and therefore required the approval of the
CCI. The CCI's finding of joint control was based on the requirement that certain
actions of MSM required the approval of at least seventy five percent of MSM's
shareholders, including (i) entry into new lines of business or opening in new
locations, and (ii) the hiring and termination of employment of key officers such
as the CEO, CFO, and Head of Marketing of MSM.
C. Independent Media Trust/Network 18 Group
In this case 9, the Independent Media Trust ("IMT") subscribed to zero coupon
optionally convertible debentures ("ZOCDs") in six target companies, and such
ZOCDs could be converted into equity shares at IMT's option within a period
of ten years from the date of subscription. Upon conversion of the ZOCDs, IMT
would hold more than 99.9% of the equity share capital of each target company.
The CCI found that such an option enabled IMT to decisively influence the management and affairs of the target companies and consequently amounted to an
acquisition of control.

CCI's order dated August 9, 2012, available athttp://cci.gov.in/May2Oll/OrderOfCommission/
CombinationOrders/C-2012-06-63.pdf.
9

CCI's

order

dated

May

28,

2012,

available

OrderOfCommissionlCombinationOrders/C-2012-03-47.pdf.

at

http://www.cci.gov.inIMay20ll/
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Another key order of the CCI in relation to control was in the Jet-Etihad deal.
This is analysed further in the next section, with particular reference to the interplay among the FIPB, SEBI and the CCI in respect of the definition of "control".
IV. THE JET-ETIHAD DEAL
The Government of India liberalised the FDI policy in relation to the civil aviation sector in 2013 and permitted foreign airlines to hold up to 49% of Indian
airline companies" . Subsequently, UAE's Etihad Airways PJSC's ("Etihad")
signed an investment agreement with of Jet Airways (India) Limited ("Jet"), a
listed Indian company, on April 24, 2013, to purchase 24% of the equity shares
of Jet (the "Jet-Etihad Transaction")". The Jet-Etihad Transaction, the first foreign direct investment in the Indian civil aviation industry, finally completed
on November 20, 201312 after navigating through the FIPB, SEBI and the CCI.
The Jet-Etihad Transaction was also subject to a post-close review by SEBI, and
the regulatory journey culminated with SEBI finally approving the Jet-Etihad
Transaction, without requiring Etihad to make an open offer, on May 8, 201413 .
A. What's the Deal?
As part of the Jet-Etihad Transaction, Etihad invested US$379 million
in Jet and acquired 24% of the equity shares of Jet (by way of a preferential allotment) 4 . In addition, Etihad also agreed to invest US$150 million into
JetPrivilege, Jet's frequent flyer program which was housed in its subsidiary, Jet
Privilege Private Limited, and provide or arrange for a loan of US$150 million to
Jet. Earlier that year, Etihad had purchased three landing/take-off slots owned by
Jet at the Heathrow Airport, London for US$70 million; these slots were subsequently leased back to Jet 5.
Based on publicly available information, the following agreements were executed in connection with the Jet-Etihad Transaction: (a) Investment Agreement
("IA'), (b) Shareholder's Agreement ("SHA"), and (c) Corporate Governance
10

NRIs are permitted to invest up to 100% of the paid up share capital of the Indian airlines.
Press Release of Jet Airways, Jet Airways and EtihadAirways Forge Stretegic Alliance Under
FDI Policy of Government of India (April 24, 2013) available at http://corporates.bseindia.com/

xml-data/corpfiling/AttachHis/Jet Airways (India) Ltd 250413.pdf.
12

13

Press Release of Jet Airways, Etihad Airways-JJET Airways Move Ahead With Staretegic
Alliance Following FinalApprovals (November 20, 2013) available at: http://corporates.bseindia.
com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachHis/Jet Airways (India) Ltd2 201113.pdf.
SEBI's order dated May 8, 2014, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi data/attachdocs/1399545948533.pdf. ("SEBI Order").

14

The post-issue shareholding of Jet is: Naresh Goyal (NRI promoter): 51%, Etihad: 24%; Public

15

Supra note 12. See also, All you need to know about Jet-Etihad deal,

shareholding: 25%.

BUSINESS STANDARD

(November 20, 2013, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/all-you-

need-to-know-about-jet-etihad-deal-113112000302 1.html).
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Code ("CGC"), a code agreed to be adopted pursuant to the SHA. As part of
the Jet-Etihad Transaction, Jet and Etihad had also entered into a Commercial
Cooperation Agreement ("CCA") under which the parties agreed to formulate
joint policies in respect of matters such as pricing, routes, marketing distribution
and sales. Further, Etihad could recommend persons for appointment to senior
management positions at Jet. In order to satisfy the various regulators reviewing
the Jet-Etihad Transaction, and most notably the FIPB, the parties had to modify
these agreements on at least three occasions in the manner set out below, in order
to assure such regulators that inter alia the effective control of Jet remained in
India and was not transferred to Etihad:
i. On May 27, 2013, the parties made changes to the SHA, CCA and CGC.
These changes were clarificatory in nature and the core nature of the
transaction remained unchanged 6 ;
ii. On September 19, 2013, the parties entered into an amended and restated
SHA, an amended and restated CCA and an amendment to the IA pursuant to the conditions imposed by the FIPB'7; and
iii. In May 2014, the parties voluntarily modified the CCA to assure SEBI
that effective control remained with Jet 8.
B. Regulatory Approvals for the Jet-Etihad Transaction
(a) FIPB approval
Under the FDI Policy, investments by foreign airlines in Indian airlines require
the prior approval of the FIPB and are inter alia subject to the condition that "the
substantial ownership and effective control of which (i.e., the Indian airline) is
vested in Indian nationals"'9.
Pursuant to the requirement for approval referred to above, Jet had filed for
the approval of the FIPB in connection with the Jet-Etihad Transaction. This was
first considered by the FIPB at its meeting on June 14, 2013. However, Jet's FDI
proposal was deferred due to apprehensions that effective control of Jet was being
transferred to Etihad, in contravention of the FDI Policy. Subsequently, a revised
proposal was submitted to the FIPB, which inter alia:
i. reduced the strength of Jet's board from 14 to 12, and reduced Etihad representation thereon from three to two;
Paragraph 3 of the CCI's order dated November 12, 2013 available at http://www.cci.gov.in/
May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C-2013 -05-122 /o200rder /o20121113.pdf]
("CCI Order").
Paragraph 7 of the CCI Order.
Paragraph 9(q) of the SEBI Order.
19 Paragraph 6.2.9.3.1(c)(iv)(c) of the FDI Policy of 2013.
16
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ii. granted Jet's promoter, Naresh Goyal, the right to nominate four directors,
including the Chairman who would have a casting vote; and
iii. retained Jet's revenue management function in India (earlier it was proposed to be shifted to Abu Dhabi)20 .
The FIPB considered the revised proposal at its next meeting on July 29,
and recommended the Jet-Etihad Transaction for approval by the Cabinet
Committee on Economic Affairs ("CCEA")22, subject to the following conditions:

201321,

i. prior Government approval would be required for any changes in the SHA
or for any change in Jet's shareholding structure;
ii. all shareholder disputes under the SHA would be adjudicated under Indian
law (earlier it was proposed to be English law); and
iii. Jet would submit new Articles of Association before the matter is put
before Finance Minister for approval and then to the CCEA 23.
The CCEA approved the Jet-Etihad Transaction on October 3, 201324.
(b) SEBI's primafacie approval
In the course of the FIPB's consideration, the Ministry of Finance (which is
represented on the FIPB) requested SEBI's views on the Jet-Etihad Transaction.
SEBI responded to the Ministry of Finance on September 25, 2013, stating that the rights to be acquired by Etihad in Jet, pursuant to Jet's Articles
of Association, the IA and the CGC "do not, prima facie, appear to result in
change in control"25 and therefore do not trigger an open offer requirement under
the Takeover Code 26. However, SEBI reserved its right to review the Jet-Etihad
20

FIPB clears Jet-Etihad deal with riders,

THE

HINDu,

(July

30,

2013 available at http:/

www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/fipb-clears-j etetihad-deal-with-riders/article4966622.
ece]; FIPB clears Jet-Etihad deal subject to certain conditions THE ECONOMIC TIMES,
(July
29,
2013
available at
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-07-29/
21
22

news/40872467 1 etihad-airways-jet-etihad-deal-fipb).
Press release of FJPB (July 29, 2013) available at http:// http://fipb.gov.in/.
An FDI proposal which results in a total equity inflow of more than INR 12 billion is required
to be approved by the CCEA after it has been cleared by FJPB. See, Paragraph 5.2.2 of the FDI

23

Policy of 2013.
Supra note 20.

24

Press

25

aspx?relid=99843.
Paragraph 3 of the SEBI Order.
Regulation 3(1) of the Takeover Code requires an acquirer, who together with persons acting in

26

release of CCEA

(October 3, 2013)

available at http://pib.nic.inlnewsite/erelease.

concert, acquires shares or voting rights in a target company which would entitle them
cise 25% or more of voting rights in such company to make a public announcement of
offer for the acquisition of shares from the public shareholders. Further, the open offer
ment is also triggered under Regulation 4 of the Takeover Code in the event the acquirer,
or indirectly, acquires control over a target company.

to exeran open
requiredirectly
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Transaction in the event other regulators found that Etihad had acquired control
of Jet pursuant to the CCA 27.

(c) CCI approval
Since the Jet-Etihad Transaction qualified as a combination under the
Competition Act, Jet filed for the approval of the CCI under the Competition Act.
The CCI, in its order dated November 12, 2013, approved the Jet-Etihad
Transaction as it was not likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.
In the order, the CCI considered the question of whether Etihad had acquired
"joint control" over Jet pursuant to the Jet-Etihad Transaction in order to determine the applicability of the exemption from notification requirements 28 . In
relation to this matter, the CCI stated in its order that "Etihad' acquisition of
twenty-four (24) percent equity stake and the right to nominate two (2) directors, out of the six (6) shareholder directors, including the Vice-Chairman, in the
Board of Directorsof Jet, isconsidered as significant in terms of Etihad's ability
to participate in the managerial affairs of Jet.... The effect of these agreements
including the governance structure envisaged in the CCA establishes Etihad's
' 29
joint control over Jet, more particularlyover the assets and operations of Jet
(emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, the CCI found that the combination, combined with the governance structure set out in the CCA, gave Etihad "joint control" over Jet for the
purposes of the Competition Act.
(d) SEBI review
Based on the CCI's observation on control, SEBI reviewed the Jet-Etihad
Transaction in order to determine if the requirement to make an open offer had
been triggered. In its order dated May 8, 2014, SEBI concluded that Etihad had
not acquired "control" over Jet for the purposes of the Takeover Code.
In its order, SEBI inter alia observed that the definition of 'control' under
Section 5 of the Competition Act is "much wider" than that under Regulation
2(1)(e) of the Takeover Code. Further, the SEBI order states that one regulatory agency may be guided by the findings of other regulatory agency on a particular issue only if the two laws are pari materia in their substance and are
being applied on the same set of facts and circumstance. This finding was also
2

Paragraph 3 of the SEBI Order.

2 Under Paragraph 1 to Schedule I of the Combination Regulations.
Paragraphs 14 and 16 of the CCI Order.
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supported by the other regulators who were corresponding with SEBI in this
regard30 .
In its order, SEBI noted that the FIPB had approved the Jet-Etihad Transaction
as being in conformity with the FDI Policy, i.e., the 'effective control' of Jet was
vested in Indian nationals and not with Etihad. SEBI also noted that:
i. Etihad had a right to nominate only two out of 12 directors on Jet's board,
as compared to Jet's promoters' right to appoint four directors, including
the chairman, who has a casting vote;
ii. Etihad did not have any veto or affirmative voting rights, or any quorum
rights at the board or general meeting;
iii. Etihad did not have pre-emptive or tag along rights; and
iv. The parties to the Jet-Etihad Transaction had voluntarily modified/
deleted the provisions of the CCA, which were the subject of the CCI's
observation on control, to reiterate that effective control of Jet vests in
Indian nationals and that Etihad had not acquired control. These changes
included (a) removal of Etihad's right to recommend candidates for senior management in Jet; (b) requiring approval from the board of Jet and
Etihad for areas of co-operation listed in the agreement, and also any
co-operative/collaborative arrangements; (c) removing Abu Dhabi as an
exclusive hub for Jet flights to Africa, North America, South America
and UAE; and (d) deleting the mechanism for Governance Procedure and
Deadlock Procedure as set out in the CCA.
Based on the above, SEBI concluded that Etihad had not acquired control over
Jet for the purposes of the Takeover Code, and Etihad was not required to make
an open offer3 . With this order, SEBI finally put an end to the regulatory uncertainty surrounding the Jet-Etihad Transaction since no further approvals were
required.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, it is clear that "control" can have different meanings
under different legislations. This is illustrated by the Jet-Etihad Transaction,
where the CCI found that Etihad had acquired joint control over Jet under the
Competition Act, but SEBI found that the same transaction did not result in an
acquisition of control under the Takeover Code (although the CCA was amended
after the CCI's approval but before SEBI's review32).

30 Paragraphs 11 and 15 of the SEBI Order.
31 The SEBI Order.
32 Section D.2.d above.
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The rulings of the CCI and SEBI in relation to the Jet-Etihad Transaction also
demonstrate that the threshold for "control" under the Competition Act is lower
than under the Takeover Code. This may be based on the different objectives of
the legislations in question: while the Competition Act seeks to regulate transactions which could potentially affect the strategic commercial behaviour of an
enterprise (or confer a particular degree of influence over such behaviour), the
Takeover Code considers the acquisition of control as an event which would
require that other shareholders of a listed company be provided an opportunity to
sell their shares due to such change in control over their company.
Apart from the differing levels of control under the Competition Act and the
Takeover Code, the orders referred to in this article also indicate certain differences between what may constitute control under the Competition Act and the
Takeover Code: for example, the CCI's order in the Jet-Etihad Transaction order
indicates that when considering rights to nominate directors it will consider this
in the context of the total shareholder directors only; SEBI also took into account
the independent directors33 . Also, the CCI's jurisprudence generally accepts that
affirmative/veto rights in relation to the strategic commercial decisions of a company indicate a level of control; the position on this point under the Takeover
Code remains unsettled. Further rulings of the regulators in question as well as
appellate authorities and courts may be expected to develop these ideas further.
In relation to the multiple regulatory loops the Jet-Etihad Transaction traversed
with the FIPB, SEBI and the CCI, while such regulatory over-lap may initially
raise red flags for foreign investors considering investments in India, the final
resolution, although overdue, appears to be satisfactory. Based on the orders of
the relevant regulators and publicly available information, the regulators involved
in the Jet-Etihad Transaction approval process appeared to have co-ordinated with
each other while considering the issues relevant to each. Further, they considered
the views of other regulators when considering issues under their purview.
The regulators also took into account the different substantive connotations of
'control' that are relevant to the regulations that each regulator is responsible for,
and in doing so, successfully steered away from the 'one-size-fits-all' approach.
Given that this Jet-Etihad Transaction was the first of its kind, one may entertain hopes for a more expeditious and stream-lined approach in the future. As
regulators become increasingly aware of the jurisprudence of other regulators,
perhaps more harmonious procedures could be implemented with a view to positively impact transaction timelines.

3

CCI's order under Section 38 of the Competition Act, 2002 in relation to the Jet-Etihad
Transaction dated November 26, 2013, available at: http://www.cci.gov.inIMay20ll/
OrderOfCommission!CombinationOrders/C-2012-05-122%20261113.pdf.

